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Abstract 
Since 2011, the issue of „sectarianism‟ has dominated the Scottish political agenda as well as 
media and public discourse. The most high-profile aspect of the Scottish Government‟s 
response to the problem was undoubtedly the Offensive Behaviour at Football (Scotland) Act 
2012. This article is based on analysis of official documentation, speeches and media 
coverage relating to sectarianism and the OBTC Act since 2011. By tracing the Act‟s journey 
from its introduction to its repeal in 2018, it challenges notions of a policymaking process 
built on consensus. It also casts doubt upon the Scottish Government‟s claims of a socially 
progressive approach to criminal justice, as the behaviours of working-class youth around 
football have been increasingly problematised, criminalised and regulated. I argue that the 
Act highlights the need for an ongoing critique of the direction of criminal justice in 
Scotland, and demonstrates the consequences of knee-jerk responses to complex social 
problems, which has relevance beyond the Scottish context.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, the issue of „sectarianism‟1 in Scotland has attracted significant political and 
media attention. Concerns about the volume and impact of „sectarian‟ marches and parades 
led to a review and a set of recommendations for governing bodies which was published in 
2005, and the Scottish Government held summits on sectarianism in 2005 and 2006. The 
Scottish media‟s longstanding interest in the relationship between football and sectarianism 
has also drawn attention to the costs and pressures on health and policing services as a result 
of antisocial behaviour and violence surrounding „Old Firm‟2 matches (see BBC News, 
2011a). Against this backdrop of existing concerns, the early months of 2011 saw a series of 
high-profile attacks with apparent racist and/or sectarian motives on people with connections 
to Catholicism, Ireland, or Celtic Football Club (or a combination of the three), including 
death threats and the mailing of bullets and viable parcel bombs (McBride, 2018). A football 
match between Celtic and Rangers on 2 March 2011 accelerated what Lavalette and Mooney 
describe as a „panic reaction‟ regarding alleged sectarianism in Scotland (2013: 24), within 
and outwith football. Media, political and public discourse constructed supporters of Celtic 
and Rangers in moralistic terms, as a „problem population‟ intent on expressing 
„unacceptable identities‟ (McBride 2011) which were, in the words of the SNP‟s Community 
Safety Minister Roseanna Cunningham, not in keeping with visions of a „modern Scotland‟ 
(BBC News, 2011b).  
The anti-sectarianism agenda that emerged from these events involved two broad 
policy and legislative strands. Since 2011, the Scottish Government committed £13.5 million 
funding to educational initiatives and community-based programmes to „understand the 
specific causes and impact of sectarianism in Scottish society‟ (SNP, 2015) and established 
                                                     
1
 ‘Sectarianism’ is a contested concept (see McBride 2018). The term is used in this article because it is 
routinely used in academic work, political and media discourse.  
2
 Commonly used phrase to describe matches involving Celtic and Rangers 
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an Advisory Group on Tackling Sectarianism with a remit to explore the nature and extent of 
the problem. The other strand - the most contested aspect of the anti-sectarianism agenda and 
the focus of this article - was the creation of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and 
Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 (hereafter the OBTC Act).
3
 The decision 
to introduce legislation solely targeting football supporters was contentious given that the 
controversy around the above-mentioned match related to on-field clashes between players 
and managers, as opposed to increased levels of disorder amongst fans. Moreover, the high-
profile incidents appeared to be characterised by anti-Irish and anti-Catholic bigotry as much 
as by antipathy towards Celtic Football Club. The OBTC Act deeply divided opinion in 
Scottish football, Scottish politics, and Scottish society more broadly. It was the first piece of 
legislation to pass without any cross-party support and was later labelled by Labour MSP 
James Kelly as „the worst piece of legislation in the history of the Scottish Parliament‟ (The 
Scotsman, 2018). The Scottish Parliament repealed the Act in 2018 after a sustained period of 
activism from supporters‟ groups and opposition parties uniting to defeat the minority 
Government. However, the Scottish Government remained steadfast in its defence of the 
legislation throughout years of criticism.  
This paper argues that the OBTC Act is a powerful case study of how the framing of a 
problem requiring policy attention and the resultant policymaking process – both of which 
are inherently political – can determine how „punitive‟ or „progressive‟ a criminal justice 
response will be.  Through analysis of official documentation, speeches and media coverage, 
this article makes two principal, related arguments. First, the OBTC Act challenges the 
Scottish Government‟s narratives of a cooperative style of policymaking (Cairney et al., 
2016). The Act was introduced and implemented in a highly top-down manner, and critics 
accused the Government of ignoring legitimate criticism and pursuing a largely tokenistic 
                                                     
3
 The article focuses on section 1 of the Act, which covers ‘offensive behaviour at football matches’. 
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consultation. This is particularly pertinent given the complex, contested nature of 
sectarianism. As legislative responses are shaped by the ways in which a problem is 
understood, one might have expected a consultative approach to try to bring together a range 
of competing perspectives. Second, analysing the OBTC Act offers an important insight into 
the direction of criminal justice policy in Scotland. Far from the social welfarist approach 
which is supposed to characterize Scottish criminal justice policy, and indeed is reflected in 
other criminal justice policies, the punitive nature of the Act arguably entrenched social 
inequalities. Supporters – who are predominately young men, often from working-class 
backgrounds – were constructed as a problem population in need of increased policing and 
legislative control, while equivalent behaviours in other contexts were not subject to the same 
attention. This undermines claims of the current Scottish Government that they have been 
more progressive than their predecessors in Scotland and, in comparison, the UK 
Government. 
A ‘Scottish approach’ to criminal justice policy making? 
The „Scottish approach‟ to policymaking (Cairney et al., 2016: 333) refers to the Scottish 
Government‟s „reputation for pursuing a consultative and cooperative style when it makes 
and implements policy in devolved areas‟. This progressive policymaking style is 
underpinned by a commitment to social justice driven by apparently „Scottish values‟. Such 
narratives frequently juxtapose the „Scottish approach‟ against the „worst excesses of 
„neoliberal‟ UK government and governance‟ (Cairney et al., 2016: 346). In the criminal 
justice sphere, Scotland has historically been understood to have pursued a less punitive and 
more welfare-based set of policies compared to the rest of the UK. Mooney et al (2015: 210) 
argue that social welfarist values were a strong driver in the pre-Devolution approach to 
youth justice, with more emphasis on rehabilitation than punishment. Scotland was 
considered to have a more progressive approach to prison policies (McAra, 1999), and 
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policing in Scotland was often constructed as less controversial than in England even if this 
„benign reputation‟ is unmerited (Murray and Harkin, 2017). Keating et al (2003:18) refer to 
Scotland‟s social democratic tradition and a „more consultative and consensual policy style, 
which makes radical policy change more difficult in the short term‟. However, it is generally 
accepted that the notion of policy divergence is in practice highly uneven. For example, 
Mooney et al (2015) highlight the high prison population - which in 2018 was 143 per 
100,000 of the national population, one of the highest imprisonment rates in Europe (Howard 
League Scotland, 2018) - as evidence of the system‟s more punitive elements. 
The early years of devolution saw pressure on Scottish Labour to follow „tough on 
crime‟4 New Labour policies, which posed further challenges to notions of „Scottish 
distinctiveness‟. The Labour-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in Scotland initially 
helped restrain a „punitive turn‟5, as Keating et al (2003:18) note that the presence of a 
Liberal Democrat at the Justice Department meant there was „less emphasis on hardline law 
and order policies‟ in Scotland. However, the 2003 election campaign saw a breakdown in 
this arrangement, and „Labour‟s insistence on tougher law and order policies was an issue in 
the subsequent coalition negotiations in which Labour insisted on new measures and took the 
Justice portfolio into its own hands‟ (Keating et al., 2003:18). Mooney and Scott (2012:8-9) 
state that youth justice policy since devolution has become increasingly punitive, 
representing the „erosion of the more welfarist approach to youth justice policy making that 
had characterised the period up to the late 20
th
 century‟. Law and Mooney (2012:5) highlight 
the increasingly punitive approach within the Scottish criminal justice system, particularly 
the emphasis on anti-social behaviour and young people in public spaces which culminated in 
                                                     
4 The Labour Government in the UK (1997-2010) sought to show strength on law and order issues. 
5 ‘Punitive turn’ originally coined by Garland (2001) in Changing nature of crime control. 
7 
 
the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004.
6
 The anti-social behaviour framework 
developed in Scotland was substantially different from the model in England and Wales, with 
more focus on prevention and fewer disciplinary elements. The „ASB family projects‟ 
established in Scotland had less emphasis on threatening sanctions, which some scholars 
attribute to the history of a more welfarist approach (Nixon et al 2010). Nonetheless, there 
remained clear punitive elements, and the fact that in the early post-devolutionary period 
there was significant convergence with the rest of the UK resulted in claims of Scotland‟s 
„detartanisation‟7 (McAra, 2008). 
For some, the 2007 election which saw the Scottish National Party (SNP) establish a 
minority Government signalled the „retartanisation‟ (McNeill, 2011) of Scottish justice 
policy. Political rhetoric from the new First Minister and other leading nationalist politicians 
was less focused on punitive measures and seemed to indicate a shift away from responding 
to social problems with punitive legislation. Kenny MacAskill‟s appointment as Justice 
Secretary was considered to boost the ability of this new minority Government to pursue 
more progressive policies (MacLennan, 2016). Cairney (2011:196-197) notes that MacAskill 
was „linked strongly to its agenda on sentencing reform and the eventual abolition of prison 
sentences below six months in favour of community service‟. Furthermore, the new minority 
Government „downplayed ASBOs and concerns about persistent young offenders‟ (Croall, 
2012:187), thus differentiating Scotland from the rest of the UK. The extent to which positive 
political rhetoric was translated into reform on the ground during the SNP minority 
government period (2007-2011) was limited: „all the major parties had fairly punitive 
agendas‟ (Cairney 2011:197). However, with the SNP‟s success in the 2011 Scottish 
Parliament elections, after which it was able to establish a majority Government, „the scene 
                                                     
6 The authors cite a scheme in 1998 whereby young people under the age of 15 who lived in public 
housing estates in Hamilton (a town in South Lanarkshire with areas of high deprivation) were given 
an 8pm curfew for six months. 
7 The decline of a distinctively Scottish approach. 
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was set for more radical and far-reaching reforms than had been feasible prior to the political 
shift‟ (Armstrong and Munro 2017:139). 
Importantly for the purposes of this article, there was a convincing sense that rushing 
to legislate to solve social problems would not be the norm going forward. So, we might 
expect divergence to be more evident in how criminal justice policy develops in Scotland. 
The framing of the new Scottish Parliament was a desire to „do politics differently‟ (Keating 
et al., 2003). And there were signs that as the SNP gained power, lessons had been learned 
from Labour‟s „tough on crime‟ approach. Respondents in Mooney et al‟s (2015:217) study 
on criminal justice policymaking between 1999 and 2007 spoke of a shift in approach: „Gone 
was the constant rush to respond and talk up criminal justice in crisis terms‟. Carnochan 
(2017:151) notes that „the new Government seemed to recognise the necessity to focus whole 
systems collaboratively on issues identified locally, delivering solutions locally and involving 
local communities in the process‟.  
This article explores the OBTC Act as a case study of policy development (and 
indeed policy reversal) in Scotland. It follows the approach by Mooney et al (2015:207) that 
„sees the development of criminal justice policy in Scotland as no mere technical process but 
as one that recognizes how politics intervenes at every step of the policy-making process‟. It 
is argued herein that the OBTC Act represented a punitive framing of criminal justice policy 
which challenges Scottish Government narratives of a progressive approach. However, the 
OBTC Act must also be placed in the broader context of how sectarianism in Scotland has 
been framed historically, and how the complex and contested nature of the issue posed 
problems for the SNP Government‟s attempt to develop a consensus around their approach. 
The politics of tackling sectarianism  
Although space does not permit an in-depth analysis of the nature and extent of sectarianism 
in contemporary Scotland, a summary of key academic debates is important for our 
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understanding of a piece of legislation which was ostensibly designed to tackle the issue. One 
influential school of thought contends that the extent of sectarianism in Scotland has always 
been subject to exaggeration and conjecture (Bruce et al., 2004). Even when the impact of 
sectarianism on social relations historically is acknowledged, demographic indicators such as 
rates of intermarriage and improved educational and employment outcomes for Catholics are 
cited to demonstrate the decline of socioeconomic inequalities and to deem sectarianism a 
„thing of the past‟ (Bruce et al., 2004; Bruce and Glendinning, 2017; Rosie, 2015). In this 
view, sectarianism is described as a Protestant-Catholic divide which a „mindless minority‟ 
refuse to leave behind despite Scotland‟s increasingly secular nature (Bruce et al., 2004; 
Bruce and Glendinning, 2017; Rosie 2015). This argument is largely supported by the 
historian Tom Devine, whose work on Irish migration to Scotland previously emphasised the 
inequalities faced by Irish Catholics (Devine, 2008), but who now contends that since the 
decline of structural discrimination, sectarianism is „on its deathbed‟ (The Herald, 2018). The 
characterisation of sectarianism as „inter-communal tension and conflict between 
ideologically opposed groups‟ (May, 2015:1), or as discrimination towards others „on the 
basis of their perceived denominational background‟ (Scottish Government, 2015:24), and 
the use of language such as „differences‟ and „animosity‟ (Rosie, 2015), posit the problem as 
one of tension between two communities.  
Some scholars criticise the above position for paying insufficient attention to power 
relations or the legacy of historical inequalities, and present alternative explanations which 
emphasise the anti-Catholic and anti-Irish nature of most of what is understood to be 
„sectarianism‟, and argue that debates should acknowledge the impact of historical patterns of 
inequality and oppression in Scotland and Ireland (Bradley, 2008; Kelly, 2010; McBride, 
2018). This work emphasises the economic, social and cultural marginalisation of the Irish 
Catholic minority  in Scotland, who occupied a lower socioeconomic position compared to 
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the Protestant majority until towards the late 20th century (Devine, 2008; Bradley, 2008; 
McBride 2018). It is notable that this perspective has previously had to contend with claims 
of partisanship and an over-reliance on „anecdotal‟ evidence (see Bruce et al., 2004; Walker, 
2001). For example, Walker (2001:43) contrasts the work of Bruce et al. (2004) to the „other 
scholars of the Catholic community, all of whom, perhaps significantly, are drawn from its 
ranks‟ and whose work is characterised as having a „pronounced sense of defensiveness and 
of scepticism‟. However, academics increasingly point to the relevance of historically 
unequal power relations. For Malloch and Goodall (2013:176), popular understandings of 
sectarianism detracts from „an imbalance of power between the larger group of mostly 
Scottish-originating Protestants and the smaller group of Scottish and Irish Catholics‟, and 
Flint and Kelly (2013:6) argue that more attention should be paid to power dynamics and key 
contextual factors such as Rangers‟ history of not knowingly signing Catholic players while 
Celtic did not have an equivalent signing policy
8
.  
Some academics critique the concept of sectarianism and suggest that popular 
understandings of sectarianism mean that the expression of Irish-Catholic or Ulster-British 
identities are frequently deemed to be bigoted in themselves. For example, Kelly (2010:2-3) 
argues that expressions of Irish Republicanism are frequently and incorrectly constructed as 
sectarian: „having a stated position on Irish politics....is sufficient condition to be labelled 
sectarian‟, resulting in what he describes as „an apolitical and culturally naïve version of 
sectarianism‟. Flint and Kelly (2013:4) state that the term „bigotry‟ might be preferred to 
„sectarianism‟ and argue that „the actual problem is not one of Irish/Ulster identification or 
expression but rather one of religious bigotry and ethnic intolerance (racism)‟. The authors 
argue that analysis should focus less on expressions of identities and instead on actions of 
intolerance or bigotry towards different ethnic, religious, and national groups.  
                                                     
8
 This practice only ceased in 1989. 
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 Polarisation in academic debates – particularly on controversial issues such as 
sectarianism – is not unusual. However, in this case study of the development of the OBTC 
Act, it is important to explore the question of which voices and perspectives have influence in 
the policy process. An illuminating example is the inclusion of Professor Duncan Morrow  
and Dr Michael Rosie on the Advisory Group on Tackling Sectarianism from 2012-2015. As 
well as chairing the Advisory Group, Morrow was tasked with producing a report in 2017 
reviewing the group‟s recommendations. In 2016 he was invited to chair an Independent 
Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion. In 2018, Morrow was 
tasked with overseeing an independent working group to come up with a legal definition of 
sectarianism (the Scottish Government Working Group on Defining Sectarianism in Scots 
Law), which Michael Rosie was subsequently appointed to. Rosie also served as an 
Independent Advisor to the Scottish Government on the issues of marches and parades from 
2015-16. 
Commenting on a perceived imbalance in terms of which academics have policy 
influence, Dr Joseph Bradley suggests that there is a favoured narrative which is in line with 
the Scottish Government‟s position: 
 
We‟ll get nowhere in terms of learning and understanding if it‟s the same bodies, 
same academics, that get yet more money to say the same things: the things that 
actually just simply re-cycle the established „wisdoms‟ about so called „sectarianism‟ 
(Scottish Catholic Observer, 2018). 
 
The questions of whose work has influence, and what kinds of evidence carry weight, are 
pertinent. Although all academics have the opportunity to influence policy (for example, in 
consultations such as that carried out for the OBTC Bill), to be included in advisory groups 
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and to be commissioned to author reports for the Scottish Government, indicates a different 
level of participation in policy development. Morrow and Rosie, and the particular 
perspectives underpinning their academic work, had visibly more influence than those with 
more critical perspectives. 
 The introduction of the OBTC Act must be seen in the broader context of the highly-
charged debates on the nature and extent of sectarianism outlined in this section. After years 
of little attention from the state (Law, 2016), the sudden rush in early 2011 to tackle the 
problem through legislation was likely to have political ramifications. Previous experience in 
the football sphere through the implementation of Football Banning Orders (FBOs) suggested 
that „the particularities of the Scottish context‟ were not sufficiently taken into account in the 
development of the legislation which had previously been used elsewhere in the UK to tackle 
hooliganism as opposed to sectarianism (Hamilton-Smith and McArdle, 2013:141). Existing 
literature on the Act focuses on the neglect of gender in debates on the legislation (Malloch 
and Goodall, 2013) and on the politicisation of sectarianism and anti-sectarianism (Crawford, 
2013). May (2015) analyses of the relationship between the Act and national identities, and 
Waiton (2018) argues that the legislation was constructed by political elites in the context of 
growing concerns about „offensive‟ language. For Crawford (2013:10) the introduction of the 
Act was a sign that „the SNP government succeeded in winning the war over the legitimate 
right to define the problem of sectarianism, as well as the solution‟. However, given the 
recent repeal of the legislation, it is a timely opportunity to trace the Act through the policy 
process, and to draw out the ways in which it came to represent a both a punitive framing of 
criminal justice policy and a challenge to the idea of consensual policymaking in Scotland. 
Introducing the OBTC Act 
The OBTC Bill was introduced to Parliament just one month after the SNP won an overall 
majority in the May 2011 Scottish Parliament elections. While most of the legislation passed 
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in the early years of the first SNP-led Government (2007-2011) received cross-party support, 
suggestive of efforts to build consensus across the political spectrum, in the case of this 
legislation, the SNP exercised its new majority. Opposition parties argued that while they 
concurred with the objective to tackle sectarianism, they opposed the style of policymaking 
that the Scottish Government had chosen, particularly the fact that efforts were initially made 
to pass the Bill under emergency legislation processes so that it could be in place in time for 
the start of the new football season in July 2011. The Policy Memorandum accompanying the 
Bill acknowledged that fast-tracking the legislation would limit the time for scrutiny, 
however the Government believed that „wider consultation would outweigh the risks of 
further damage to Scottish football and our society if we do not take immediate action to 
address the issues arising during the 2010/11 season‟ (2011:11).  
Extracts from a parliamentary debate in June 2011 (Scottish Parliament, 2011a) 
illustrate how political opponents seemed to be challenging the Scottish Government to live 
up to their rhetoric of a consensus-building approach and to avoid rushing the legislative 
process: 
 
„We cannot tackle sectarianism from the top down. We need a joined-up approach 
that involves people from different communities throughout Scotland‟ (Alison 
McInnes, Liberal Democrats).  
 
„In an oral presentation on the bill‟s provisions at the stakeholder meeting on 17 June, 
the civil servant tasked with advising on the policy of the Bill stated that civil servants 
had been instructed only some three weeks ago to produce a Bill on the issue, whereas 
they would normally expect the production of a Bill to be the outcome of a process of 
research and consultation extending over 18 months‟ (Helen Eadie, Labour). 
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First Minister Alex Salmond then announced a delay of six months to allow a wider 
consultation process to take place, stating: „We have a majority in this chamber, but we need 
consensus‟ (BBC News, 2011c).  
During the consultation process, concerns were raised by supporters‟ groups, most 
notably through the formation of Fans Against Criminalisation, a campaign group which 
embarked on a sustained period of resistance. Religious organisations, academics, charities, 
the Law Society, the Human Rights Commission, and the Scottish Justices Association also 
expressed concerns (McBride, 2017). Critics emphasised that there was existing legislation 
covering the issues that the OBTC legislation apparently was created to tackle (see McBride, 
2017 for summary). Several submissions to the consultation considered the Bill to be 
„discriminatory‟ towards football supporters. It was noted that most religiously-aggravated 
crimes took place outside of a football context (Scottish Parliament, 2011b:6-7), yet the 
Scottish Government was unable to justify why football supporters would require control 
through additional law when similar behaviours in other contexts would not be subject to 
legislative control. The Justice Committee‟s report also noted witnesses‟ concerns, including 
from equalities groups, „that the Bill should not bring large numbers of young people into the 
criminal justice system‟ (2011b:1).  
However, the extension to the policymaking process and the consultation did not 
appease critics. Labour MSP James Kelly, a member of the Justice Committee, commented: 
 
It seems to me that, when the Scottish Government paused back in June, 
which was welcomed by all, the process was frozen. It also seems to me that 
the Scottish Government has not interacted with the process, has not listened 
to the concerns that have come through in the evidence and has, therefore, 
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adopted a take-it-or-leave-it approach on the bill‟ (Scottish Parliament, 2011b: 
478). 
 
Analysis of reports suggests that it was only through having a majority (five of nine) of MSPs 
on the Justice Committee that the SNP could claim committee support for the legislation. 
When the Bill eventually passed in December 2011, opposition parties issued a statement 
accusing the SNP of „railroading‟ the Bill through parliament: „The SNP has used its majority 
to force through [a] bad law that risks doing more harm than good. It sets a worrying 
precedent for this Parliament‟ (BBC News, 2011c). Despite commitment to „high levels of 
consultation‟ in policymaking, the Scottish Government used its parliamentary majority to 
impose the policy in a highly top-down manner. It is, therefore, important to unpick the SNP 
Government‟s motivations for pressing ahead with the legislation in the face of widespread 
critique and political opposition.   
In a previous study on elite perspectives on the OBTC Act (McBride, 2014), 
interviewees suggested that passing the legislation was a way to demonstrate political 
strength. They emphasised that the Scottish Government „had to be seen to be doing 
something‟ in response to perceptions of increased „sectarian‟ behaviour and disorder in 
football. Analysis of media reporting of sectarianism during the Bill‟s passage through the 
Scottish Parliament reveals a consistent narrative which constructed football supporters as 
„risky‟ and in need of harsher social control measures (McBride, 2011). „Official‟ sources, 
mainly from the Scottish Government or the police, were given most exposure. That is not to 
deny that there were legitimate concerns around, for example, marches and parades, as well 
as anti-social behaviour around particular football matches which had an impact on policing 
and health services (BBC News 2011a). However, political discourse drew heavily from 
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these concerns, which were often conflated and sensationalized, and the OBTC Act was 
presented as a coherent response to these problems. 
Policy development was supposed to be based on consensus and to represent a shift 
away from centralization. Yet the only consensus appeared to be between the police and an 
increasingly centralized Scottish Government. Significantly, the legislation would be 
implemented by a newly centralized police force, with the creation of Police Scotland in 
2013. The Act was accompanied by a range of increased police powers and resources, 
including the establishment and funding of the Football Coordination Unit 
for Scotland (FoCUS)
9
. The „politics of policymaking‟ was evident in how sectarianism was 
invoked to build a case for certain policy decisions. The Scottish Government‟s desire to 
demonstrate its competence in the criminal justice system, Police Scotland‟s requirement to 
protect resources in the context of public service cuts, and heightened media interest on the 
relationship between football, sectarianism and violence, coalesced to create the conditions 
for the legislation to be pushed through. As there was limited time for scrutiny and 
consultation, the agendas of such powerful actors were relatively unchallenged.  
As well as a desire to prove its managerial competence in the criminal justice system, 
the Scottish Government arguably sought to position itself as more progressive than the UK 
Government on key moral and social issues. Judgements about which identities and 
behaviours were in keeping with a „modern Scotland‟ came to shape policymaking: „This Bill 
is a crucial first step in pursuing our vision for a better Scotland‟ (OBTC Bill Policy 
Memorandum 2011: 3). May (2015:7) argues that the Act „serves a political purpose in that it 
appears to demonstrate that the Scottish Government is committed to tackling inter-
communal tension in a way that successive Westminster parliaments have not‟. Of course, 
                                                     
9 FoCUS was set up following the 2011 ‘Football Summit’ and aimed to develop a consistent 
approach to policing football-related disorder across Scotland. 
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politics did not only shape the Scottish Government‟s behaviour at this stage of the 
policymaking process: there was also political capital to be had from opposing a controversial 
piece of legislation, thus undermining the SNP as the governing party. Policy positions were 
undoubtedly influenced by debates on the constitutional question of Scottish independence – 
and who was better placed to represent Scotland‟s interests - which increasingly divided the 
mainstream political parties in Scotland in these years. 
Responding to the ‘problem’ of sectarianism in football  
As Prior (2009) notes in relation to anti-social behaviour, defining a problem is a key aspect 
of responding to it, and it is notable that although political and media rhetoric has 
consistently framed the Act as an anti-sectarianism measure, the word sectarianism is absent 
from the text of the legislation. Indeed, the highly contested nature of sectarianism has meant 
that it „has not been used in any criminal legislation in the UK‟ (Hamilton-Smith et al 
2015:16). In the OBTC Act, the word „offensive‟ is used to denote supposedly „sectarian‟ or 
other „anti-social‟ behaviours. The Act created an offence of engaging in behaviour „in 
relation to a regulated football match‟ which „is likely to incite public disorder‟ and which is 
hateful, threatening or „other behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely to consider 
offensive‟. Crucially, an offended party or a person likely to be incited to public disorder 
does not have to be present for the law to be enforced, a point later defended by former 
Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill: „The absence of good people to be offended doesn‟t 
make something inoffensive if it patently is offensive‟ (The Herald, 2016).  
For critics, the „reasonable person‟ test veers into dangerous legal territory in relation 
to who counts as a „reasonable person‟, and the subjective nature of offensiveness10. The 
„methods of abuse‟ covered by the legislation give some indication of the behaviours being 
                                                     
10 see Scottish Human Rights Commission 2011 submission to Report on the Offensive Behaviour at 
Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill at Stage 2 
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targeted. These are broken down into the following categories: „Banner/flag‟; „Gesture‟; 
„Speech‟; „Singing‟; and „Generally offensive‟. Importantly, connotations of „offensive‟ 
behaviour arguably reinforces individualistic understandings of sectarianism in which 
increased regulation of football supporters is considered to be the solution. Concerns around 
this had been raised during the OBTC Bill‟s consultation process, including from those 
academics with critical perspectives on the issue of sectarianism and the OBTC Bill, as 
evidenced in the Justice Committee report (Scottish Parliament, 2011a). Professor Graham 
Walker noted that there was a significant risk of „challenging the validity of people„s identity 
and of the expression of that identity in Scotland‟. Professor Devine emphasised that there 
was sufficient existing legislation to tackle sectarianism, a point supported in submissions by 
two legal academics Dr David McArdle and Dr Sarah Christie (Scottish Parliament, 2011a). 
Dr John Kelly expressed concerns about the „catch-all‟ nature of the „reasonable person‟ 
measure (Scottish Parliament, 2011a), and Dr Stuart Waiton argued that working-class 
football supporters would be subject to criminalisation for behaviours that would be legally 
acceptable in other contexts, and so would no longer enjoy equal treatment under the law 
(Scottish Parliament, 2011a:25).  
The fact that these concerns were not addressed raises the question of what evidence 
carries weight in the policymaking process, and had significant implications for the final 
version of the legislation. Supreme Court Judge Lord Brodie commented that the Scottish 
Parliament had created „a criminal offence with an extremely long reach‟.11 The extent to 
which this is perceived as a good or a bad thing is at the heart of debates: unnecessary 
criminalisation of football supporters or a necessarily tough response to a social problem? 
Charges under the Act came quickly after it was brought into law on 1 March 2012. 
Although space does not permit an in-depth account of the Act in practice, there are some 
                                                     
11 Scotcourts website, PROCURATOR FISCAL, DINGWALL v. JOSEPH CAIRNS 
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examples which illustrate the illiberal nature of the legislation. An evaluation into the 
implementation of the Act highlighted the fact that representatives of Police Scotland 
described fans as „risk groups‟:  
 
This categorisation of young supporters and „singing sections‟ as risk groups, whilst 
potentially appropriate on occasions, also seemed commonplace and potentially 
problematic, in particular when sections of supporters, who whilst maybe having the 
potential to be offensive, were clearly not associated with more violent disorder, came 
to draw on the scarce police assets and resources normally reserved for violent risk 
groups (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015: 56).  
 
Decisions about which songs, chants, or slogans were sufficiently „offensive‟ to merit a 
criminal justice system response was reliant „on the subjective judgement of a police officer‟ 
(Law, 2016:102), giving the police significant power to make moral judgements regarding 
the behaviour of football supporters. 
Participants in previous research (McBride, 2018) described police as being more 
„heavy handed‟ after the Act was introduced, with policing methods increasingly shifting 
towards surveillance tactics and the regulation of behaviour and speech. Being filmed by 
going into games and within the stadium – something that was seemingly rare before the 
legislation – was raised as a key concern, and the use of cameras was overwhelmingly 
targeted at specific areas of the stadiums or groups of young working-class male supporters 
(Hamilton-Smith et al., 2015). This risk-orientated policing approach towards groups of 
supporters deemed to have the potential to become involved in violent conduct naturally 
created division and mistrust between fans and police (McBride, 2018). There were 
accusations of police harassment and some „flashpoints‟, including the „kettling‟ of a group 
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of Celtic supporters during a protest (The Herald, 2013). Concerns about the unnecessary 
criminalising of young people with no previous criminal records appeared to be have weight.  
Throughout its existence, opponents of the Act consistently campaigned to have the 
legislation repealed. Fans Against Criminalisation (FAC) was founded in 2011 on the basis of 
challenging the Act which they considered to be discriminatory towards football supporters: 
„it is both discriminatory and dangerous to create a law which creates an offence for one 
group within a society, when the same actions or behaviours would not result in a criminal 
charge for others‟ (Fans against Criminalisation website, no date). FAC developed petitions 
and organized protests, including a rally which attracted 3000 football fans in 2013 (BBC 
News, 2013). The group made particular use of social media to draw attention to raise 
awareness of the perceived injustices of the Act. They also met with opposition MSPs as well 
as members of the Scottish Government, and appeared at Holyrood Committees. Though fans 
groups‟ concerns seemed to be largely marginalized in the initial stages of developing and 
implementing the Bill, they became more active stakeholders as criticism intensified. 
From intensifying criticism to repeal 
Having committed to reviewing the legislation when it was passed in 2011, the 
Scottish Government commissioned an external evaluation of section one of the Act, to be 
carried out by an independent research team drawn from the University of Stirling, the 
University of Glasgow and ScotCen Research.
12
 The research, undertaken between 2013 and 
2015, involved a multi-method approach and consulted with a wide range of stakeholders, 
including football supporters, criminal justice system personnel, and representatives from 
football clubs. The evaluation‟s findings were relatively balanced and included critical voices 
                                                     
12 As a part time Research Assistant on the evaluation, I was involved in the data collection process, 
and to a lesser extent in the writing up of the report. However, in this article I employ secondary 
analysis of the published report. 
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who expressed concerns about the Act‟s implementation as well as the principles 
underpinning the legislation. 
What is illuminating for the purposes of this paper is the Scottish Government‟s 
handling of the evaluation. On the day of its publication on 12 June 2015, the Minister for 
Community Safety Paul Wheelhouse announced that the Government was responding 
directly to concerns about supporters with no previous criminal records being caught up in 
the criminal justice system by funding a „Diversion from Prosecution‟ programme. He later 
suggested that this response „chimes with concerns that have been raised by football clubs 
and other groups including Fans Against Criminalisation‟ (Scottish Parliament, 2015). 
Opposition politicians accused the minister of being disingenuous, and Labour MSP Michael 
McMahon challenged him to withdraw his remarks, stating that: „Fans Against 
Criminalisation see no succour in those who should not be facing prosecution in the first 
place being diverted away from any prosecution‟.  
The presentation of the evaluation‟s findings was notable. The ministerial statement 
announced that the Scottish Government had commissioned YouGov to carry out an 
independent poll, separate to the evaluation, yet the layout of the statement‟s headline – 
which was then reproduced in media coverage – conflated the two pieces of evidence. The 
use of the poll also raises methodological concerns. For instance, the wording of the question 
which apparently saw 80% of Scots „directly support‟ the OBTC Act – a key statistic cited in 
the ministerial statement and media coverage - was as follows: 
 
„The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications Act aims to 
tackle sectarian or offensive chanting and threatening behaviour related to football 
which is likely to cause public disorder. To what extent do you support or oppose this 
law?‟ 
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To disagree with this „leading‟ question would infer that one supports sectarianism and 
threatening behaviour. This selective and distorted use of evidence obscured much of the 
qualitative research conducted with supporters of various clubs over the two years, as well as 
a more rigorous survey of fans carried out by ScotCen as part of the evaluation.
13
 Cairney 
(2017:500-501) draws attention to the epistemological and methodological tensions in what 
constitutes „good evidence‟ in policymaking, stating that there are „political choices about 
which forms of evidence to prioritise and how to use evidence to inform practice‟. The last-
minute commissioning of the YouGov poll appears to have been motivated by a need to 
demonstrate that the Act was working and to offset criticism. 
Debates about the Act‟s legitimacy culminated in the launch of the Repeal Bill in 
June 2017 by Labour MSP James Kelly. All four of Holyrood‟s opposition parties had 
pledged to scrap the Act in their 2016 Scottish Parliament election manifestos, and the loss of 
the SNP‟s majority paved the way for repeal. There was undoubtedly political capital to be 
gained by undermining the SNP and winning favour with those sections of the Scottish 
population who were opposed to the Act. Given that Labour had fought the 2011 election 
painting the SNP as „soft on crime‟, a public attack on the SNP for being too punitive was a 
noticeable shift. 
The now minority Government remained defensive in the face of criticism and 
political opposition. In 2016, Minister for Community Safety Annabelle Ewing commented 
that repeal „threatens to set us back as a country in our efforts to effectively combat prejudice, 
hate crime and sectarianism and ultimately to drive such behaviour out of Scottish society‟ 
(BBC News, 2016). Throughout the process of the Repeal Bill, the tone of debates around the 
                                                     
13 ScotCen surveyed Supporters Direct Scotland members (4130 total) in two sweeps: Aug-Sept 2013 
and July-Aug 2014, whereas the YouGov poll was conducted immediately before the publication of 
the Evaluation with a total sample size of 1044 adults (with no indication of whether football fans) 
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Act – from the SNP and from opposition parties – was highly confrontational and at odds 
with notions of consensual policymaking. The Repeal Bill was passed in March 2018 and the 
law was removed from the statute book the following month. It signalled the end of the line 
for a piece of legislation that had caused so much controversy and raised many questions 
about the SNP‟s approach to the criminal justice system and its ability to lead a consensual 
policymaking process more broadly.  
Discussion 
This article has demonstrated that the OBTC Act reveals the inconsistencies that have beset 
the SNP-led Scottish Government‟s criminal justice agenda. The rush to legislate over 
sectarianism symbolised the misplaced optimism that lessons had been learned from previous 
knee-jerk „tough on crime‟ approaches to criminal justice. The speed at which the 
Government was willing and able to respond to the problem – compared to other social issues 
– suggests that working-class football supporters were considered „easy targets‟, fitting into 
what MacLennan (2016:78) termed the „“neds”14 agenda‟ of the Scottish Government and 
Police Scotland. The OBTC Act must be seen in the context of broader criminal justice 
policies and trends which reflect the increasingly moral intervention of the neoliberal state 
into people‟s lives. Bell (2011:166) argues that New Labour‟s approach to crime was heavily 
based on „social interventions designed to remoralise the underclass‟: a focus on culture 
rather than structure and blaming the „poor‟ values of individuals for society‟s problems. 
Notions of individual responsibility and other „good‟ morals are inextricably linked to elite 
standpoints on what values are acceptable or unacceptable in the neoliberal state (Harvey, 
2007:82). Sections of the working class are represented as „problem communities‟ in media 
                                                     
14 Commonly understood to stand for ‘non-educated delinquents’, it is worth emphasising 
that this concern with ‘problematic’ working class youth predated the SNP. 
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and political discourses (Johnston and Mooney, 2007), essentialising the working-class as 
deviant and requiring regulation.  
The OBTC Act came into force in the context of increasing concerns relating to 
policing practices in Scotland. Murray (2014:3) found that in 2010 „the rate of stop and 
search per capita in Scotland was nearly four times higher than the comparable rate per capita 
in England and Wales‟. A key feature of „stop and search‟ is the undoubtedly classed nature 
of its practice, with mounting evidence that it was „employed in abundance in areas of 
relative deprivation and, in particular, on younger people‟ (MacLennan 2016:78). Police 
Scotland was accused of trying to undermine the research findings, including identifying and 
utilising an academic supportive of the policy to publicly counter Murray‟s position (The 
Herald, 2015). There are interesting parallels here with the Scottish Government‟s reliance on 
a select few academics whose view on sectarianism is in line with the status quo, and the last-
minute commissioning of the YouGov poll to offset criticism of the OBTC Act as explained 
in the previous section. MacLennan argues that „attempting to shut-down all discussion about 
policing policy reflects an illiberal streak that is becoming increasingly commonplace in the 
Scottish Government‟s approach to justice policy‟ (2016: 74).  
However, Murray and Harkin (2017) note that in the more „heated‟ environment 
following the centralisation of Police Scotland, the relationship between the Scottish 
Government, the police hierarchy, and the media no longer functioned to effectively obstruct 
criticism of policing practices in the way it previously had. Following intensified scrutiny, the 
Scottish Government announced in 2015 that non-statutory stop and search would be 
abolished. Stop and search and the OBTC Act were underpinned by similar assumptions – 
that working-class youth required increased regulation – and debates on the legitimacy of 
both were taking place at the same time. Yet there was no comparable political will to accept 
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the shortcomings of the Act, and it took the loss of the SNP‟s majority in Parliament for the 
legislation to be overturned. 
Was it simply that football supporters are less likely to receive sympathetic media 
coverage? Football has long been subject to anti-social behaviour style regulation, and the 
context of 24-hour rolling media coverage has escalated the demand for quick, tough 
responses to alleged football-related disorder. Brick (2000) described the Football (Offences 
and Disorder) Bill (brought in under New Labour and applicable to England and Wales) as 
extending the principle of harm to include acts of speech and an increasingly „moralistic‟ 
form of regulation. Similar processes in Scotland preceded the introduction of the Act. 
However, this paper has demonstrated that it was specific concerns about the „sectarian‟ 
football fan – deriving from the uncritical acceptance of the long-established narrow 
understanding of sectarianism – which shaped the introduction of the OBTC Act and the 
extent to which it was defended against criticism. This suggests that complex and 
controversial social problems like sectarianism in Scotland pose challenges for contemporary 
analysis of criminal justice policy. Research must analyse how specific problems are framed 
as requiring a legislative response, and uncover whose voices are included and excluded in 
this process. 
These findings have ramifications for attempts to „characterise‟ a country‟s criminal 
justice approach, or to make cross-country comparisons of criminal justice policy, given the 
many contradictions that can exist within a nation-state. Cairney (2016:213) contends that 
notions of a „Scottish style‟ of policymaking can distract from the reality that „all 
governments face the same policymaking constraints and tend to respond in similar ways‟. 
Despite the SNP‟s previously critical stance towards New Labour‟s „neoliberal‟ approach to 
criminal justice, the evidence presented in this paper points to much convergence with their 
predecessors in the Scottish Government and the UK state. It is possible that the position of 
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strength that the SNP unexpectedly found itself in following its unpredicted majority in the 
2011 election negated the need to build consensus, in line with Lijphart‟s (1999) 
characterisation of „majoritarian‟ versus „consensus‟ democracies. The requirement to 
demonstrate competence to govern perhaps outweighed its aspiration for a progressive and 
consensual approach to criminal justice policymaking, as espoused when in opposition and 
minority government. Armstrong (2018) contends that we should be wary of binary 
classifications of „high‟ and „low‟ punishment societies, because this neglects the „specific 
political, historical, cultural, social, and contingent forces of a specific context‟, and the case 
study of the OBTC Act and sectarianism adds weight to this argument. 
Finally, the arguments presented in this paper have relevance beyond academia. 
Sectarianism will continue to dominate media and political discourse, and it is important that 
politicians and policymakers refrain from using this issue as a means of political point-
scoring. This only undermines genuine grassroots efforts to tackle the problem. Relatedly, 
anti-sectarianism measures – whether through legislation or via „softer‟ policies such as 
education or community programmes – should be underpinned by a theoretically sound 
understanding of the phenomenon, its historical context, and how it manifests itself in 
contemporary society. In Scotland and beyond, lessons can be learned from the case study of 
the OBTC Act as a knee-jerk response to a complex and contested social problem.  
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